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PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVISITED: TAKING THE RATIONALE FOR

NON-RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS TOO FAR
Ronald A. Brand **

I. INTRODUCTION

Several years ago I wrote an article on punitive damages largely for the
purpose of informing our negotiating partners at the Hague Conference on
Private International Law about the role of punitive damages in U.S. law.'
This was done in the midst of negotiations toward a general convention on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters.2 Those negotiations have moved to the more modest (and

more realistic) goal of a Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court
Agreements.' Punitive damages, however, have remained a controversial
aspect of U.S. law; an aspect often criticized both at home and abroad. They
are the subject of a special provision on recognition ofjudgments in the draft
Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, and continue to
generate a good deal of interest.
Neither U.S. law on punitive damages, nor the foreign climate regarding
their reception has remained static, and there are significant recent
*

Professor and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School

of Law.
** The JournalofLaw and Commerce adheres to The Bluebook Uniform System of Citation,but
the Journalof Law and Commerce has created uniform citations for certain sources not addressed by The
Bluebook. Moreover, with respect to foreign language sources for which the Journal of Law and
Commerce was not provided an English translation, the editors have relied on the author for the veracity
of the statement drawn from such sources.
1. Ronald A. Brand, PunitiveDamagesandthe RecognitionofJudgments, 43 NETH. INT'L L. REv.
143 (1996) [hereinafter Punitive Damages]. Portions of the initial discussion of the current article rely
heavily on this earlier work of the author.
2.
For a discussion of those negotiations and the failure to reach a comprehensive convention, see
Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague PreliminaryDraft Convention Text on JurisdictionandJudgments:
A View From the United States, XL RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 31

(2004); Ronald A. Brand, CurrentProblems, Common Ground,andFirstPrinciples: Restructuringthe
PreliminaryDraft Convention Text, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM

THE HAGUE 75 (John J. Barcelo, III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
3.
See Ronald A. Brand, A Global Convention on Choice ofCourt Agreements, 10 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 345 (2004). Information on the negotiations can be found on the "work in progress" section
of the Hague Conference website at http://hcch.e-vision.nl.
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developments that deserve attention. The other three articles in this
symposium focus on the reception of punitive damages judgments in
Germany, Italy, and Spain, and there is no need to repeat that information
here. It is useful, however, to note the continuing legislative attack on
punitive damages in the United States at both the state and federal level, as
well as recent developments in case law and treaty negotiations concerning
their reception abroad.'
In the discussion below, I first provide a brief review of the background
against which current punitive damages law in the United States continues to
operate. This includes consideration of the continuing evolution of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on punitive damages. Next, I give attention to
a specific case in the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with the recognition
of a U.S. (Florida) punitive damages judgment-and the corresponding, but
inconsistent, effort at new uniform Canadian legislation that would limit
punitive damages recognition in the courts of that country. Finally, I note the
current approach to punitive damages in the recognition and enforcement
provisions of the draft Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court
Agreements, and the possible implications of that development on future
multilateral arrangements.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Damages designed to punish a particular party are neither a recent
development nor a remedy unique to litigation in the United States. They
have a history of at least four thousand years-including mention in the Code
of Hammurabi, 5 and the Book ofExodus 6-that has involved repeated debates
on their value and purpose.7 They were a part of English law in multiple
damages statutes as early as 1278,8 and in cases as early as the eighteenth

4.
This article will not deal with state and federal statutory efforts aimed at limiting punitive
damages. Most of the discussion of U.S. law will be limited to the courts, with specific emphasis on recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. For further information on statutory change, see Brand, PunitiveDamages,
supra note 1; John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A ComparativeAnalysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 391, 401 (2004).
5.
See Code of Hammurabi §§ 5, 8, 12, 107, 112 & 265 (from 2000 B.C.), compiled in 1 ALBERT
KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW (1915).
6.
"If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox,
and four sheep for a sheep." Exodus 22:1.
7.
See Brand, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 145; 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R.
REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 3 (2d ed. 1989); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages:
A Relic That Has Outlivedlts Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984).
8.
The statute of Gloucester provided for treble damages for waste. 6 Edw. I, c. 5. See SIR
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century.9 Not only have punitive damages continued to be a part of the
English legal system," but the House of Lords recently expanded the
conditions under which they are available." Courts in other leading
Commonwealth nations-Australia, 12 Canada, 3 and New Zealand'a-also
have demonstrated general receptivity to awarding punitive damages. 5
As in other areas of the law, U.S. law on damages borrows heavily from
English doctrine. Nonetheless, the propriety and availability of damages
designed to punish a defendant in civil actions has been a subject of consistent
debate. In the mid-nineteenth century, this debate was focused in treatises by
Simon Greenleaf and Theodore Sedgwick. Greenleaf believed that,
"[d]amages are given as a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction to the
plaintiff, for an injury actually received by him from the defendant. They
should be precisely commensurate with the injury; neither more, nor less."' 6
Sedgwick accepted a principal focus on compensation, but wrote that when a

FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE

TIME OF EDWARD 1522 (2d ed. 1899) ("under Edward I, a favourite device of [English] legislators [was]
that of giving double or treble damages to 'the party grieved."'); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 518 (1957).
9.
See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763) (where the jury was
specifically instructed that they could award damages, and the court stated that, "[d]amages are designed
not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any
such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."); Huckle
v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763) (where "exemplary damages" were awarded in recognition
that a jury could return a verdict in excess of actual compensatory loss).
10. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221 (H.L.) (where Lord Devlin noted that a
jury can take into account the motives, conduct and wealth of the defendant in awarding damages beyond
mere compensation). See also Cassell & Co., Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087-88 (H.L.) (listing
the categories of cases in which punitive damages are available).
11. See Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2002] 2 A.C. 122 (H.L.)
(rejecting an earlier Court of Appeals limitation of the types of cases in which punitive damages may be
awarded in AB v. S.W. Water Serv. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 507, 523 (C.A.)). See Gotanda, supra note 4, at 401.
12. See, e.g., Uren v. John Fairfax and Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 CLR 118 (High Court 1996) ("if it
appeared that, in the commission of the wrong complained of, the conduct of the defendant had been highhanded, insolent, vindictive or malicious or had in some other way exhibited a contumelious disregard of
the plaintiff's rights" (Taylor, J. at 3) then "damages may be given of a vindictive and uncertain kind, not
merely to repay the plaintiff for temporal loss but to punish the defendant in an exemplary manner' for his
outrageous conduct." (Menzies, J. at 15)).
13. See Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [ 1989] 58 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 208 (McIntyre,
J.) (punitive damages might be awarded when the defendant's conduct has been harsh, vindictive,
reprehensible, or malicious).
14. See Foggv. McKnight, [1968] N.Z.L.R. 330.
15. For a more detailed comparative discussion of punitive damages, see Gotanda, supra note 4, at
398-439.
16. SIMON GREENLEAF, II A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 244 (3d ed. 1850, reprint ed.
1972).
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case involves fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, a "wholly
different rule" applies."' 7 In such cases, according to Sedgwick, the law
"permits the jury to give... punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages" that
"blend[] together the interest of society and of the aggrieved individual," and
"not only... [compensate] the sufferer, but [ ] punish the offender."' 8
In the early twentieth century, some U.S. courts emphasized English
common law traditions, the role of the jury, and individual liberty injustifying
awards of civil damages designed to punish:
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty
regulated bylaw. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of government,
discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential, and unscrupulous,
vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the
courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not
sufficiently punished by the criminal law. 9

The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with the law on punitive damages
for more than one and one-half centuries. Until recently, the Court took a
rather hands off approach, allowing lower courts to deal with exemplary
damages with little interference from above. In the 1852 case of Day v.
Woodworth,20 the Court sided with Sedgewick, finding it to be "a wellestablished principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all
actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity
of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.2
Thirty-three years later, in MissouriPacificRailway Co. v. Humes,22 the Court
further emphasized the leeway given to trial courts, stating that "[t]he
discretion of the jury in [punitive damages] cases is not controlled by any very

17.
1972).

18.

THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 38-39 (1847, reprint ed.

Id.at 39.

19. Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 238,147 N.W. 18,19-20 (1914). Compare Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342 (1872), in which the court, though finding itself bound to allow an award of exemplary damages,
denounced the concept, stating that "[t]he idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and
an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of law." Id. at 382. See also Murphy v.
Hobbs, 7 Colo.541, 5 P. 119 (1884); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891);
Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1891).
20. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
21. Id.at 371. For similar decisions, see Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897); Lake Shore &
M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. (40 Davis) 101, 107 (1893); Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. v. Quigley,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 213 (1858).
22. 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
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definite rules., 23 Deference to jury awards remains to this day one of the
principal driving forces behind allowing damage awards in excess of simple
compensation to the plaintiff, and the subject of a constitutional debate that
has molded recent jurisprudence.
Despite repeated acknowledgment of the availability of punitive damages,
U.S. courts and commentators have not always agreed on the rationale
underlying that availability. Generally, however, the focus has been on a
combination of punishment and deterrence.24 It is perhaps ironic that one of
the best elaborations of the purpose of punitive damages is found, not in a
U.S. decision, but in a 1992 decision of the German Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof). 25 That case involved an attempt to enforce in Germany
a California judgment in a civil sexual abuse case, including punitive
damages, against a defendant who had returned from California to Germany
in order to avoid parallel criminal proceedings. While the Bundesgerichtshof
refused recognition and enforcement of the punitive damages award as being
a function of criminal proceedings in the German legal system, 26 it provided
a useful summary in noting that punitive damages serve "up to four principal
purposes. '2 7 It described those purposes as:
1) to punish the offender for its improper conduct;
2) to add a sufficient sum to the compensatory damages to deter the offender and others
from such improper conduct in the future;
3) to reward the injured party for its part in enforcement of the law and "the associated
improvement in general law and order;

' 28

and

4) to supplement otherwise inadequate compensatory damages.

23.

29

115U.S.at521.

24. "[U]nder the law of most states, punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and
deterrence." Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). See also Coryell v. Colbough,
I N.J.L. 77 (N.J. 179 1) (in which the jury was instructed to give damages "for example's sake, to prevent
such offenses in [the] future") (italics in original); Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 74 So.
541 (La. 1917); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1879); and Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072
(Wash. 1891); Sales & Cole, supra note 7, at 119-24.
25. BGHZ 118, 312 (1993), translatedin 32 I.L.M. 1320(1993). For a more complete discussion
of the case, see Volker Behr, Enforcement of UnitedStates Money Judgmentsin Germany, 13 J.L. & COM.
211 (1994).
26. 32 I.L.M. at 133940.
27. Id. at 1337.
28. Id.

29. Here it should be noted that the U.S. diverges from most other legal systems of the world by
generally not allowing the winning party in litigation to collect its attorney fees from the losing party (the
loser pays rule). The Bundesgerichtshof's reference to inadequate compensation was in part an effort to
suggest that punitive damages could be seen to compensate the plaintiff for the combination of the loss of
value through the U.S. contingent fee payment to the winning plaintiff's attorney, and the failure to collect
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The past two decades have brought new focus to punitive damages law
in the United States. Since the law of damages generally is a matter for state
(as opposed to federal) regulation, much of this development has come in the
form of state statutory restrictions and limitations. These have included caps
on the level of damages, limitations on the types of cases in which punitive
damages may be awarded, and restrictions on instructions to juries. These
developments have served to limit the availability and amount of punitive
damages awards. While they are important, they are not the focus of this
discussion, however.3"
More general restrictions on the availability and amount of punitive
damages have come as the result of seven decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
rendered over the past two decades. While the earliest of these cases
confirmed both the availability of punitive damages and the authority ofjuries
to exercise discretion in awarding such damages, the more recent ones have
imposed important limitations on such awards.
In the 1989 case of Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal,Inc.,3 the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment3 2 does not apply to a punitive damages award in a civil case
between private parties,33 and that federal common law does not allow a court
to interfere with the jury's punitive damages award.34 The first of these
holdings focused on the distinction between punishment under the criminal
law system and damages in the civil law that are payable to a private party.
The Court determined that "the Eighth Amendment ... Excessive Fines
Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable
to, the government, ' 35 and that the Amendment "points to an intent to deal
only with the prosecutorial powers of government,"36 and not to issues of civil
damages.
With the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause thus made
unavailable for an attack on punitive damages, litigants turned to the Due

attorney fees from the other party.
30. For further discussion of these restrictions, see Brand, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at
159-63, Appendix; Gotanda, supra note 4, at 423.
31. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
32. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
33. 492 U.S. at 259-60.
34. Id. at 280.
35. Id. at 268.
36. Id. at 275.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,37 arguing that due process
places limits on a jury's ability to award punitive damages.3" In the early
1990's, this argument too brought little relief for punitive damages
defendants; but that changed as the issue was repeatedly brought to the Court.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 9 a verdict of $1,040,000
"contained a punitive damages component of not less than $840,000, 4' ° thus
presenting a 4/1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Pacific Mutual
argued that the amount of punitive damages, as compared to compensatory
damages, was so unbalanced as to violate due process. In his majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that "unlimited jury discretion--or
unlimitedjudicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." 4 ' He
refused, however, to adopt a formula for determining the outer limits of
punitive damages under a due process analysis, stating that the Court, "need
not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case."4' 2 He instead placed a very high burden on a party arguing for
any limits on punitive damages, suggesting substantial deference to the jury,"
and noting that "'a thing ...practised for two hundred years by common
consent, ... will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it,"' Justice Blackmun suggested that it was enough to satisfy due process
that the state Supreme Court (Alabama in this case) had provided review to
confirm the relationship between the punitive damages award and the goals
of deterrence and retribution.45 Thus, the punitive damages award did not
"cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." '

37. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Due process was not raised in Browning Ferris. "Because petitioners failed to raise their due
process argument before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals, and made no specific mention
of it in their petition for certiorari in this Court, we shall not consider its effect on this award." 492 U.S.
at 277.
39. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
40. Id.at 6 n.2.
41. Id.at 18.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 16-17.
44. Id.at 17 (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
45. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 20-21.
46. Id.at 24.
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Like many earlier cases, Haslip emphasized deterrence and punishment
of the civil defendant as goals of punitive damages.47 Whether deterrence
could justify a punitive damages award substantially in excess of
compensatory damages was left open for the case-by-case approach sanctioned
by the majority opinion.48
The idea that a punitive damages award far in excess of related
compensatory damages could violate due process again reached the Court in
its 1992 term in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.49 In a
West Virginia slander of title case, the jury had awarded $19,000 in actual
damages and $10 million in punitive damages. While in Haslipthe Court had
stated that a four-to-one ratio of punitive to actual damages, "may be close to
the line" of constitutional permissibility," the TXO decision upheld the West
Virginia award of punitive damages at a 526/1 ratio. The TXO decision in fact
rejected a test based on a simple comparison of a punitive damages to
compensatory damages. 5 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion "eschewed an
approach that concentrates entirely on the relationship between actual and
53
punitive damages,"52 focusing instead on a reasonableness test.

47. Id. at 21.
48. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, took a more aggressive approach. After a review of
punitive damages in U.S. law, and a dissertation on the historical development of the concept of due
process, he concluded that "[t]o effect their elimination may be wise, but is not the role of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring). He found categorical support for punitive damages, in any
amount, as a result of their consistent and continual existence in U.S. jurisprudence. "[No procedure
firmly rooted in the practices of our people can be so 'fundamentally unfair' as to deny due process of law."
Id. at 38.
49. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
50. 499 U.S. at 23.
51. 509 U.S. at 458.
[W]hile we do not rule out the possibility that the fact that an award is significantly larger than those
in apparently similar circumstances might, in a given case, be one of many relevant considerations,
we are not prepared to enshrine petitioner's comparative approach in a "test" for assessing the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards.
52. Id. at 460.
53. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, rejected the idea ofa "substantive due process" right that
punitive damages be reasonable. "To say (as I do) that 'procedural due process' requires judicial review
of punitive damages awards for reasonableness is not to say that there is a federal constitutional right to a
substantively correct 'reasonableness' determination-which is, in my view, what the plurality tries to
assure today." Id. at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring). The plurality found reasonableness in a $10 million
punitive damages award "in light of the amount of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of petitioner,
the fact that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and
petitioner's wealth. Id. at 462.
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In the 1993 term, the Court heard Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg,54
challenging a 1910 amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibitingjudicial
review of punitive damages verdicts "unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict."55 Stating that "'meaningful and
adequate review [of punitive damages awards] by the trial court' and
subsequent appellate review"5 6 are required by the Due Process Clause, the
Court sent the matter back to the Oregon Supreme Court with instructions to
provide such review.
The fifth case in this recent line of decisions is BMW ofNorth America,
Inc. v. Gore,57 decided in 1996. Mr. Gore originally received a verdict for
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. By the
time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the Alabama
Supreme Court had cut the punitive award to $2 million, resulting in a 500/1
punitive-to-compensatory ratio. While a 526/1 ratio had been upheld in TXO,
in BMW, the Court held the punitive award to be "grossly excessive," and thus
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court's
analysis, however, also brought in interstate commerce interests, focusing on
the individual state's interest in awarding punitive damages and the resulting
"burdens on the interstate market" for the goods in question (automobiles). 8
This led to the elaboration ofthree guideposts to be considered in any punitive
damages decision:
1) the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct involved];
2) the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and the
punitive damages award; and
3) the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.59

This was a radical departure from the approach in TXO, now limiting the
analysis to only three factors, and making the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages one of those factors. The limitation to conduct within
the jurisdictional state further insured that future punitive damages awards
would be smaller than in past cases.

54.

512 U.S. 415 (1994).

OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
56. 512 U.S. at 420, quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
57. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
58. Id. at 571.
59. Id.at 575.
55.
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The 2001 case of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.,6 added further to this line of cases by holding that a court should apply
a de novo standard when reviewing the trial court's determination of the
constitutionality of punitive damages. Thus, the application of the BMWtest
is a matter of law that will result in limited deference to the decision of the
trial court.
The seventh, and most recent, in the line of Supreme Court decisions
came in 2003 with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.6 The Court was again faced with a punitive damages award ($145
million) that was much larger than the corresponding compensatory award ($1
million). For the first time, however, the court engaged in providing specific
guidelines regarding the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. The
Court retained a focus on punishment and deterrence as the goals of punitive
damages,62 and, like it did in BMW, made clear that punitive damages are to
be limited to the goals of the state in which the action is brought.6 3 While the
Court "decline[d] to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed," it stated that "in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process."' Thus, while no specific numbers were
given, the decision clearly indicated that any ratio beyond 9 to 1 was likely to
be too large.65

60. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
61. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
62. Id. at 409:
It should be presumed that a plaintiff has been made whole by compensatory damages, so punitive
damages should be awarded only if the defendant's culpability is so reprehensible to warrant the
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.
63. Punitive damages are to be awarded only in an amount necessary to "satisfy] the State's
legitimate objectives," and a State does not "have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to
punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of its jurisdiction." Id.
64. Id.at 425.
65. The Court further fudged the numbers, stating:
[R]atios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where "a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.".
The
converse is also true, however. When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee. The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.
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III. THE RECEPTION OF U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS ABROAD
Foreign courts have struggled with punitive damages judgments brought
from the United States for recognition and enforcement.6 6 The German
Bundesgerichtshof in 1992 determined that it would be against German public
policy to enforce the punitive damages portion of a California judgment.6 7 A
similar result was reached in Japan, at least in regard to the specific facts of
the case involved.68 A 1989 Swiss decision, on the other hand, recognized for
enforcement purposes a California punitive damages judgment in the face of
public policy arguments.6 9
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld enforcement of
punitive damages awarded by a Florida court in Beals v. Saldanha.7° The
Beals case was rather controversial because of its unusual facts. A Canadian
couple purchased land in Florida for $6,000 in 1981, and were offered
$12,000 for it in 1984. A series of lawsuits resulted when the purchasers
began building on the wrong lot. While the Canadian couple responded to the
first suit, which was subsequently dismissed, they did not respond to later
suits, and a defaultjudgment was ultimately entered against them for $210,000
in compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages, all subject to
12% interest. By the time the judgment was brought for enforcement in
Ontario, its value was in excess of Cdn$800,000. The Beals case is significant
in that it clearly extends the earlier analysis of inter-provincial recognition and
enforcement of judgments in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye7 to
judgments from other countries. In doing so, it reviewed as bases for nonrecognition the grounds of fraud, natural justice, and public policy, rejecting

66. See, e.g., the discussions of recent Spanish and Italian cases in the accompanying articles by
Scott Jablonski and Lucia Ostani, discussing Miller Import Corp. v. Albastres, STS, Nov. 13, 2001
(ExequiturNo. 2039/1999) (Spain), and Parrottv. Fimez S.p.A., Court of Appeal of Venice, Oct. 15,2001
(Italy).
67. BGHZ 118, 312 (1993), translatedin 32 I.L.M. 1320 (1993).
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each of them as applied to the specific case. The result is a strong indication
that challenges that could have been raised in the original foreign litigation are
not to be raised later when the resulting judgment is brought for recognition
and enforcement in Canada.
The Beals Court ultimately had little trouble enforcing the punitive
damages portion of the Florida award along with the rest of the judgment.
This is particularly significant in light of the parallel development in Canada
of a new Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.72 Had the Uniform
Act been in effect in Ontario when the Beals judgment was presented for
recognition and enforcement, the result might well have been different.
Section 6 of the Act reads as follows:
Section 6:
Limit of damages
6. (1) Where the enforcing court, on application by a judgment debtor, determines
that a foreign judgment includes an amount added to compensatory damages as punitive
or multiple damages or for other non-compensatory purposes, it shall limit enforcement
of the damages awarded by the foreign judgment to the amount of similar or comparable
damages that could have been awarded in [the enacting province or territory.]
Excessive damages
(2) Where the enforcing court, on application by the judgment debtor, determines that
a foreign judgment includes an amount of compensatory damages that is excessive in the
circumstances, it may limit enforcement of the award, but the amount awarded may not
be less than that which the enforcing court could have awarded in the circumstances.
Costs and Expenses
(3) In this section, a reference to damages includes the costs and expenses of the civil
proceeding in the State of origin.

This provision allows courts to limit recognition and enforcement of both
punitive and "excessive" damages. As to punitive damages, section 6(1)
allows limitation to the amount that "could have been awarded in" the
province or territory in which recognition is sought. Canadian law does
recognize and allow punitive damages,7 3 even in the civil law jurisdiction of
Quebec.74 Thus, analysis for recognition purposes would require that the court
effectively reopen the damages award of the originating foreign court and
determine what amount would have been awarded in the Canadian court in
which recognition and enforcement is sought.

72.
73.
74.

Available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=l &sub=le5.
See Gotanda, supra note 4, at 431-40.
Civil Code of Quebec, ch. 64, 1991 S.Q. 1621 (Can.).
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IV. THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT

The Canadian Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act has not
been adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and thus is not in
effect in any province or territory. Its language is borrowed from earlier drafts
at the Hague Conference on Private International Law of a provision meant to
be part of a comprehensive global convention on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. That project has since been
limited to the development of a convention on exclusive choice of court
agreements.7" The Canadian delegation at The Hague was instrumental in
having included in the text of the larger convention, and now in the choice of
court convention, a provision that allows a court asked to recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment to revisit both non-compensatory (punitive and
exemplary) damages and "grossly excessive" compensatory damages. Article
33 of the Preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Hague Special Commission
on 30 October 1999,76 reads as follows:
Article 33 Damages
1. In so far as a judgment awards non-compensatory, including exemplary or punitive,
damages, it shall be recognised at least to the extent that similar or comparable damages
could have been awarded in the State addressed.
2. a) Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor has the opportunity to
be heard, satisfies the court addressed that in the circumstances, including those
existing in the State of origin, grossly excessive damages have been awarded,
recognition may be limited to a lesser amount.
b) In no event shall the court addressed recognise the judgment in an amount less
than that which could have been awarded in the State addressed in the same
circumstances, including those existing in the State of origin.
3. In applying paragraph 1 or 2, the court addressed shall take into account whether and
to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and
expenses relating to the proceedings.

When the project turned to a focus on the enforcement of exclusive businessto-business choice of court agreements, and the recognition and enforcement
of the resulting judgments, this provision was retained in the draft text with
only slight alteration.77
75. For a discussion of the broader negotiations, see Brand, The 1999 Hague PreliminaryDraft
Convention Text on Jurisdictionand Judgments: A View From the United States, supra note 2. The new
focus on a choice of court convention is discussed in Brand, A Global Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, supra note 3.
76. Available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgmdrafte.pdf.
77. Article 15 of the 2004 Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements provides:
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Canada obviously has the option of adopting whatever internal law it
desires on the recognition of foreign judgments. A decision to incorporate
language from earlier multilateral treaty negotiations, however, should include
consideration ofjust how this language would change current Canadian law,
as well as whether it is appropriate outside of the original context.
Obviously, the language in Section 6 of the draft Uniform Act would
change Canadian law and require courts to reopen the issue of both
compensatory and non-compensatory damages at the request of a party. As
to punitive damages, this may not be particularly troublesome. Stating that
exemplary damages may be recognized and enforced only to the extent they
could have been awarded in the court being addressed may, as a practical
matter, be little more than another way of approaching the traditional public
policy defense to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus,
the analysis might not be much different from that applied by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Beals when faced with the question of recognition and
enforcement of a Florida judgment that included punitive damages,78 or that
applied by the German Bundesgerichtshof in its application of the public
policy ground for non-recognition.7 9 The approach, however, is different, and
specifically authorizes the court to reopen the damages determination made
by the originating court, listing principles applicable in the recognizing court.
Having such a provision in a uniform act, or in a multilateral convention,
thus may not do much to change the results in individual cases. It may be
little more than codification of existing practice. From a civil law perspective,

Article 15 Damages
1. A judgment which awards non-compensatory damages, including exemplary or punitive
damages, shall be recognised and enforced to the extent that a court in the requested State could
have awarded similar or comparable damages. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the court
addressed from recognising and enforcing the judgment under its law for an amount up to the full
amount of the damages awarded by the court of origin.
2. a) Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor has the opportunity to be heard,
satisfies the court addressed that in the circumstances, including those existing in the State of
origin, grossly excessive damages have been awarded, recognition and enforcement may be
limited to a lesser amount.
b) In no event shall the court addressed recognise or enforce the judgment for an amount less
than that which could have been awarded in the requested State in the same circumstances,
including those existing in the State of origin.
3. In applying the preceding paragraphs, the court addressed shall take into account whether and
to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating
to the proceedings.
Available at http://hcch.e-vision.n/upload/wop/dgmwdl 10e.pdf.
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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this may be an appropriate approach to the law. From a common law
approach, the matter may be very different. Such a provision locks in the
current approach to recognition and enforcement of judgments that include
punitive damages elements, and does not allow for natural judicial
development of the law. It may be that legislatures want to capture this
position and not allow judicial development. Common law traditions,
however, have demonstrated that this is not always a wise approach to matters
that are subject to change in ways we cannot always predict.
The greater problem comes in the extension of the Canadian statute and
the draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements to allow
reopening the determination of compensatory damages. Such an approach
may arguably have been appropriate in a comprehensive multilateral
convention dealing with (most) all aspects of originating courtjurisdiction and
then creating a basic obligation to recognize the resulting judgments. Even
there, however, its effect was a back-door reopening of the entire case through
the determination of damages by the recognizing court. In a uniform act such
as that proposed in Canada it would be a major step back from the Moorguard
and Beals decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court; decisions that
demonstrate a liberal approach to foreign judgment recognition that is
appropriate in a modem business climate."g
In a modem international convention applicable only to cases in which
two business parties (and not consumers) have made an exclusive agreement
on the court that is appropriate to hear disputes between them, allowing a
court asked to recognize and enforce the resulting judgment to reopen the
merits of the case through the back-door approach of reconsideration of the
amount of damages is wholly inappropriate. Not only is it inconsistent with
a desire for predictability of results, but it could completely destroy the value
of other provisions of the convention that compel recognition of the choice of
court and of the resulting judgment. Business parties who willfully and
knowingly choose a specific court for adjudication of their disputes certainly
can be assumed to have chosen the damages rules of that court as well as other
procedural elements. Their choice is meaningless if it can be reopened by a
court asked to recognize and enforce any judgment from the chosen court.
This is exactly what the provision in the Canadian uniform act and the draft
Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements would authorize with

80.

See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition ofForeign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The

Economics ofPrivate InternationalLaw, in THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 592

(Jagdeep Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
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language that goes beyond punitive damages to the consideration of
"excessive" compensatory damage awards.
V. CONCLUSION

The concept of punitive damages has a long history throughout the world,
and a particularly rich genealogy in the common law. Recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases have moved from allowing extensive discretion in the trial court
on the issue of punitive damages to the adoption of the view that due process
requires quantitative limitations on the amount of punitive damages, to be
imposed by reviewing courts such that judgments not exceed "a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages."81
While this evolution has occurred in the United States, so has the law
regarding reception of punitive damages judgments in foreign courts
developed. In judicial decisions of a number of countries, in proposed
uniform acts, and in multilateral treaties, the rules on recognition and
enforcement of punitive damages judgments have been the subject of debate
and development. That development is not yet complete at the writing of this
article. While it may result in rules that simply reflect current practice in the
application of the public policy basis for non-recognition of foreign
judgments, it has the potential to go much further and lock in rules that are
less flexible and perhaps less appropriate than a public policy analysis. Even
if such an approach is appropriate, even more troubling is the use of such
provisions for the attachment of rules that would allow recognizing courts to
reopen the issue of compensatory damages from the originating court. This
would be a major step back in the development of the law, wholly inconsistent
with the needs of a twenty-first century business community for certainty and
predictability in legal relationships.

81.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 (2003).

